Heidegger and the Thorny Issue of (Re)configuring Facticity

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Abstract The purpose of this article is twofold. It first seeks to prove that the notion of facticity in Heidegger’s work saw a major change after Being and Time. While several studies did deal with facticity as it appeared before the magnus opus and show the influence it had on the latter’s development, hardly any have dealt with what happens to facticity after Sein und Zeit. This is mostly because facticity, as it imploded, took on different names which fall under the heading of ground-attunements. Secondly, I will show the ambivalent character of this new facticity, where many essential notions, such as thrownness, truth, attunement and guilt, shifted meanings, sometimes almost imperceptibly or surreptitiously. I will show that this ambivalence comes from the fact that the shift in question allowed for an opening of facticity while at the same time bringing in restrictive limits, and thus a closing-off of certain essential issues. This has left several adumbrated questions, such as responsibility, in abeyance.

Keywords being-historical; facticity; ground-attunements; Heidegger, Martin; Kehre, reservedness
Facticity has had its history from Descartes to Heidegger and beyond. Its definition can only be problematic, in so far as it deals with the individual never as a mere entity in itself, but always within a context, be it intellectual, social, political or physical. A very basic definition could be: “the fact that one is,” which in itself opens all sorts of questions as to the *what, where and how* of this factual being. If facticity can be traced to Descartes’ subject as an effect of an outside power and a bodily presence, it is eventually reconfigured by Heidegger as thrownness. This thrownness, with its accompanying attunements, is presented as essential to Dasein not only ontologically but also in its knowledge of itself and thus in its thinking. By making facticity essential to thought, Heidegger thus overturns a whole tradition which sees the passions which determine facticity—as for Descartes—as something to be set aside, in order to reach self-knowledge.

The question of facticity remained, as I shall show, a driving force behind and within Heidegger’s entire philosophy. It allowed for a thorough critique of the subject, replacing it with the ontological question carried by and through Dasein and reconfiguring the issue of freedom by subjecting it to a more original analysis. It is thus essential to understand the way facticity has evolved, in so far as the changes it encountered determined the way Dasein, its presence in the world and its freedom received more precision. In the past, most literature dealing with Heideggerian facticity has tended to retrace its origin in the philosopher’s first writings,1 especially in his first Freiburg lecture courses on Aristotle (Heidegger 1994b, 1995) and ontology (Heidegger 1988) and in his postdoctoral *Habilitation* on Duns Scotus (Heidegger 1978, 189–411). There has been, since the (re)discovery of Heidegger’s early writings, serious genealogical work, such as Kisiel’s (1995), dealing with the root origins of *Being and Time*. Such work went back to the notion of life (Campbell 2012), the phenomenology of Christian life (Gander 2002),2 finitude and death (Nelson 2000), the self (Gander 2002) and *praxis* (Nelson 2000). Research has been done on the transition from the first lecture courses on facticity which were given before

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1. See, for instance, the collection edited by J.-F. Courtine (Courtine 1996), which includes conference procedures on this subject. Most interesting are the talks given by F. Volpi, J.-F. Courtine, M. Haar, I. Schüssler, F. Dastur, J. Grondin, Marquet and Kiesel.


2. We may note also the link Caputo (1994) establishes between the primary hermeneutics of factual life, which brings out the categories, and the categories of the heart, where Heidegger meets Luther and Pascal.
Being and Time to the later composition of Being and Time. We see this, for example, in some of Krell’s work (1994). However, to my knowledge, there has been no monograph written, establishing a parallel between facticity in its mature stage as thrown-being in Being and Time and facticity in the writings which followed Being-historical thinking.

In addition to this absence, an ‘indication’ has rendered this article necessary. We find it in certain judgments made in research on Heidegger’s facticity. There is first what Campbell rightfully asserts as facticity’s distinctive trait its being “ambiguous.” Its ambiguity, for him, has to do with its being at the same time what gives a new vigour to the theoretical and the source of fallenness (Campbell 2012, xiii, 6, 64–7)—hence its link to Ruinanz in the Winter 1920–21 lecture course (Heidegger 1994b)—as we find it, once again, in Being and Time. Then there is what Krell says. He considers facticity the locus and sign of a crisis: “Whenever we do return to Being and Time we ought to be chastened by the realization that Heidegger’s earliest reflections on factual life bring his magnum opus of 1927 to a point of perpetual crisis” (Krell 1994, 94–9). My exploration of Heidegger’s œuvre after the “turning,” die Kehre, has actually led me to enlarge and even generalise this conclusion. I maintain this ambiguity, not with the purpose of linking it, like Campbell or others do, to a double function, but in order to work out its consequences on the transition from Sein und Zeit to later writings. And if one is to continue to speak, like Krell, of a crisis, I will show that we are then to be more precise: the crisis occurs in determining freedom.

I shall leave aside facticity in its early, pre-formative status, since it has been amply studied, and I will follow instead the modifications it has known. I will start with its seemingly most accomplished form in Being and Time, then go through the Kehre and beyond. More specifically, I will approach this issue through the changes die Geworfenheit underwent, the introduction of Being-historical, the rethinking of tradition and guilt, and the opening and multiplication of ground-attunements. This study will show that the first facticity as encountered in Sein und Zeit did indeed see new exploration later, but also and especially that some of the important questions which it had opened were eventually closed off, which made its new version more limited. What I term the second facticity is finally called upon as providing us with a key to understand what is often too hastily called “the second Heidegger,” as well as the essential problems facing our determination of the Kehre, its meaning(s) and its effects. I will show that facticity has evolved from the thrownness and anxiety of individual Dasein handed over to itself, in Being and Time, to that of Dasein as embedded in a number of attunements and as thrown, handed over, by Being in a history
which Dasein must take upon itself and bear with the few: philosophers and poets. This evolution has made for a more complex Dasein, but it has also opened major questions as to that Dasein’s freedom and responsibility.

I. The Heideggerian Repetition of Facticity—A Critique of Descartes

Heidegger accuses Descartes at the outset of *Sein und Zeit*, in §6, of failing, in *Meditations* II and III (Descartes 1911)\(^3\), to investigate the meaning of facticity—its sense, *Sinn* (Heidegger 1977, 21). This failure’s symptom, I would say, is the surreptitious Cartesian drift from the questions and problematic inherent to facticity to the refuge of facticity as effect, thus displacing the issue. Indeed, Descartes’ hyperbolic doubt stops at the grounding of my-self’s facticity, giving it no explanation which starts from within it and from what led to it in the first place. Instead of investigating the provenance and the concomitant constitution of the self’s facticity, its meaning is left in abeyance and its origin is thrown into a transcendence which has little to do with factuality and concrete origin. We thus neither get what this facticity means nor how it concretely befell the self which I am in my concrete existence, as a being in a specific space and time. Briefly stated, what was yet to be considered is both the meaning/direction of the factual self and its provenance—its whither and whence. This lies at the heart of the phenomenological-hermeneutic need to move from the factuality of the self as effect to its factuality/facticity as a thrown being.

In order to do so, Heidegger carries out a more ‘primordial’ Hermeneutics of the self. My self’s facticity continues to be experienced; however, this no longer occurs through a thinking which gradually dispels doubt; rather, more originally, through what Heidegger terms, in §29, “*die Befindlichkeit*,” i.e. “finding-[oneself]-in,” which literally breaks out into (a) different *die Stimmung(en)*, i.e. attunement(s), each time (sec. 29). Every time facticity is experienced, such experience is properly sensed as a *Befindlichkeit*. That term must then be elucidated!

The *Befindlichkeit* emerges in an experience which I make of myself with myself. It is a radical experience, wherein I finally find myself, *mich befinde*. This Sich Befinden is in opposition to the finding of something in-the-world, which depends on a *Vorfinden*, a finding before-oneself. That is for example how I simply meet a stone, a tree or a cat right there before

\(^3\) Descartes, in the second Meditation, discovers or uncovers the self in its facticity. He then, and instead of giving the self’s meaning, moves on, in the Third Meditation, to consider the self as an *effect*. The fact becomes an effect from a higher source.
me. In the Befindlichkeit, I find myself always in a Stimmung. More precisely, we may say that the Stimmung is the experience of my-self as being-in-the-world; and it is within this framework that I experience the fact that “I am.”

We must however ask: how, i.e. in what manner, is that done? An answer may be gleaned from §29. First, “das pure ‘daß es ist’ zeigt sich,” the pure that I am, as Dasein, shows itself. It does so in an attunement, since “Die Stimmung macht offenbar, ‘wie einem ist und wird’” (134), the attunement makes manifest “how things are or are becoming for one.” But secondly, “das Woher und Wohin bleiben im Dunkel,” the whence and whither of my-self remain in darkness. The following paragraph tells us:

Diesem in seinem Woher und Wohin verhüllten, aber an ihm selbst um so unverhüllter erschlossenen Seinscharakter des Daseins, dieses “Daß es ist” nennen wir die Geworfenheit dieses Seienden in sein Da, so zwar daß es als In-der-Welt-sein das Da ist. Der Ausdruck Geworfenheit soll die Faktizität der Überantwortung andeuten. (135)

(This Being-character of Dasein, veiled in its whence and whither, but in itself all the more openly unveiled, this “that it is” we call the thrownness of this being in its there, in such a way that as being-in-the-world, it is the there. The expression “thrownness” should suggest the “facticity of its being delivered-over.”)

Heidegger explains the use of thrownness in this instance: “The expression ‘thrownness’ used here is meant to suggest the ‘facticity of being delivered-over.’” The “whence” and “whither” then find their provenance two paragraphs later:

Auch wenn Dasein im Glauben seines “Wohin” “sicher” ist oder um das Woher zu wissen meint in rationaler Aufklärung, so verschlägt das alles nichts gegen den phänomenalen Tatbestand, daß die Stimmung das Dasein vor das Da bringt, als welches es ihm in unerbittlicher Rätselhaftigkeit entgegenstarrt. (136)

(Even when Dasein, in faith, is “sure” of its whither or thinks it has a knowledge of its whence from rational enlightenment, all of this changes nothing in the phenomenal fact that attunement places Dasein before the “that [it is]” of its there, which faces it in its inexorable enigma.)

The origin, i.e. the whence, and the destination, i.e. the whither of Dasein may not be obtained by any rational principle or investigation. The origin
of Dasein and its where-to are veiled in the experience of facticity; and knowledge of myself which finds resources in a faith or knowledge which can be, for example, historical in the general or scientific sense or biological, can only give a hint of my provenance and destination. Whatever the possibilities or results of all this, what Heidegger seems to mean here is that this veiled origin and its concomitant veiled destination are constitutive of thrownness or being-thrown (135).

This means that finding oneself is finding oneself as thrown, i.e. as a being delivered-over, not by a higher Cause, but to oneself by nobody and toward nowhere, in such a way that one understands oneself as the Last, i.e. the weight of existence, as Heidegger had said quite early, in 1923, where facticity took on the meaning of care (Grondin 1994, 347). Existence has then a certain ‘gravity’, a burden (Last) which I am to bear and carry (Heidegger 1977, 135). This also means that in the Befindlichkeit I am thrown as a being indeed in the world, and in such a way that each Stimmung opens each time the Whole of the world as such and gives a possibility of existence in the Heideggerian sense, which is to be understood along a totality which opens. This gives Dasein a kind of concern for intra-worldly times which can never be the effect of another being.

It is important to note at this point that in understanding the self’s factical being through the attunements, Heidegger opposes and entirely breaks away from a long-standing tradition concerning passions. For him, even in one’s theoretical sojourn along with intra-worldly beings, at the heart of Dif-ference, die Unterschied, one is attuned in one way or another; while traditionally, it had always been thought that to know oneself one had to break free from what passion offers and suggests—from what comes factically with me. All of the Cartesian “passions of the soul” are thus thrown into disuse (Descartes 1990). Facticity, for Heidegger, as primordial and as being-thrown is at the same time a finding-one-self-in and a finding-one-self-as, it is a having-to-exist from a number of inherited possibilities which at first present themselves to me as there with me—they are possibilities which I have not chosen.

Facticity as a burden as well as the pure “I am” is modally indifferent at the beginning, since the possibilities I have are: either going along with the Verfallen in its fall, thus letting myself live according to the projects which I have not chosen and will not choose; or otherwise, as I find such

5. See the excellent collection, edited by Pierre-François Moreau (2006), of articles on the passions, dealing with Machiavelli, Juan Luis Vivés, Montaigne, Shakespeare, Descartes, Gracian, Pascal, Spinoza, Locke, Leibniz, Diderot, Rousseau and Hume.
projects here with me, I may ground them again—give them a foundation—through a feigned retreat which allows me to live them properly. I could do so, because I am in my facticity absolutely devoid of all origins and destinations. This gives me the possibility of an initial isolation, whence there is each time an event, starting from and in Stimmungen which, most of the time, give me facticity in the mode of ‘fleeing facticity’ and rid me of the burden of existence, of my letting myself live (Heidegger 1977, 139).

This is basically where things stand with facticity and Dasein in Sein und Zeit. But an important shift, affecting facticity directly, would occur later and may be witnessed in the Brief über den Humanismus.

II. Facticity after the Kehre
I shall retain two statements from the 1946 Letter on Humanism. Heidegger asserts first that “Sein lichtet sich dem Menschen im ekstatischen Entwurf. Doch dieser Entwurf schafft nicht das Sein. Überdies aber ist der Entwurf wesenhaft ein geworfener” (Heidegger 2004a, 337). (“Being clears itself to man in the ecstatic projection/throw. However, that projection/throw does not create Being. Furthermore, the projection/throw is essentially as being projected/thrown.”) What the projection/throw indicates here is of course Dasein, i.e. myself as a being in project, as working from my facticity toward the future. In the projection/throw and thus in myself as being in project, Being “clears itself” to me. Things are at this point not entirely at odds with Sein und Zeit. But Heidegger continues:

Das Werfende im Entwerfen ist nicht der Mensch, sondern das Sein selbst, das den Menschen in die Ek-sistenz des Da-seins als sein Wesen schickt. Dieses Geschick ereignet sich als die Lichtung des Seins, als welche es ist. (337)
(What throws in the projecting/throwing is not man, but Being itself, which destines man into the ek-sistence of Da-sein which is his essence. This destiny enowns as the clearing of Being.)

What Heidegger says here could never be comprehended from within the hermeneutic horizon of Sein und Zeit. From a thrownness, coming from nowhere, into a world and a tradition to either annul and/or take on, a near qualitative leap is made into a thrownness coming from elsewhere, from a thrower which is Being itself. This has only been made possible through the Kehre, effected already in the Beiträge (Heidegger 1994a).

The issue lies within what thrownness is and what it has come to designate and imply. The moment or instant of thrownness is the heart of the problem. We must indeed ask: what does it mean or entail for one to say
that the moment which throws man so that he may be the “there,” so that he “is/be,” i.e. so that he is the projecting of Being in a certain way, is precisely Being itself, where man is enowned? Within the framework of Sein und Zeit, asserting that “der Werfende ist... das Sein selbst” simply means nothing. The assertion can only mean something if there is a major change in the analytic, a Kehre, which is brought about by a change in the meaning of facticity. (Granted, there is always the notion of a mission, before and after the Kehre, but that mission sees a redefinition which is at the heart of a new facticity and may serve us, as the reader shall see, to allow for the latter to come forth for our comprehension.)

In Sein und Zeit Dasein is “the thrown ground itself” in that “it projects/throws (entwirft) itself on possibilities into which it has been thrown (geworfen).” This is done in such a way that the self, the Dasein as its-self, can “never bring that ground into its power,” control it so to say, and yet must, “as existing, take over Being-a-ground,” as it “understands itself in terms of possibilities.” Dasein’s thrownness is thus a thrownness into a tradition, an inheritance which is always already there and constitutes a large number of possibilities for it. At the same time, in that very thrownness, as in what can be planned and effected from there, i.e. in projection, “there lies, essentially, a nullity.” In other words, Dasein starts in something and nothing at the same time. The inherited tradition is nullified—it is given a “not-”value; which means that it is considered as a pure and simple indifferent delivery, until it has been made, by Dasein, into a true repetition by itself for its-self: “The resoluteness coming back to itself and delivering itself (sich überliefernde) [as a tradition] then becomes a repetition of a possibility of existence which has come down [to us/Dasein]. The repetition is the explicit delivering-over/tradition, which means the return into the possibilities of the Dasein which has been there (dagewesenen).” That very repetition is the mission Dasein is to assign itself, nay its authentic choice of its “hero,” der Held (Heidegger 1977, 385)—a word which will have its importance in and


after the *Kehre*—transforming what is there with it into a *situation* whence it may reach its resolution as to its Being.

At the core of Dasein’s comportment and thought, as to the Überlieferung, is thus a *break*, a Bruch. The tradition is to be interrupted and considered a pure and simple indifferent delivery, since it has to be/become a true repetition, a “starting over.” The words of René Char, which so affected Hannah Arendt, resound here and come closest to expressing Dasein’s situation: “Our heritage is not preceded by any testament.” History then is evacuated from the start. Dasein, whatever it may be, is free and exists its facticity as situated. This shows in its effecting and possessing certain experiences which it always makes in certain disclosures. Those disclosures are the Grundstimmungen, of which some are ontologically fundamental, such as Angst, brought to the fore as the main Befindlichkeit in Sein und Zeit (sec. 40).

Things shift completely in the Kehre, and this occurs on several levels conjoined and/or entailed in the assertion “*Das Sein ist das Werfende.*”

We no longer take as a starting point for thinking the facticity of Dasein which opens the possibility of abysmal freedom, but rather those very possibilities we find here with us. We thus do not break with what has always already delivered those possibilities over. We clearly move from Dasein as it is in § 29 of Sein und Zeit, i.e. as the origin and reference in its own thrownness which it is to assume freely, i.e. from Dasein as the starting point—a Dasein which clearly stands for all human individuals, for all humanity—to Being, Sein, which throws Dasein and assigns to it to be the there, das Da, so as to open the clearing, die Lichtung:

Being conveys itself (übereignet sich) to man, only in so far as the clearing of Being enowns (sich ereignet). But that the there, the clearing as the truth of Being itself, enowns (sich ereignet), is the provision (Schikung) of Being itself. That is the destiny (Geschick) of the clearing.¹⁰

This new perspective is given as a completed Hermeneutics for the truth of what is asserted in page 212 of Sein und Zeit, concerning the es gibt: “Only in so far as Dasein is, is there (gibt es) Being” (Heidegger 2004a, 336):

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“‘es gibt’ is used to provisionally avoid ‘Being is’.11 The “turning” is clear: Dasein now is in so far as Being throws Dasein in its Da to thus open the clearing of Being itself, of Being as the clearing, where possibilities lie and are to be assumed12. We are no longer on the side of Dasein’s mission toward itself, which breaks with all tradition, but on the side of a mission given to Dasein, assigned to it. Dasein has to start with what is found there with it. And the first two questions we may ask, before we further clarify this mission, are: What is there with Dasein? And Who is to assume that mission by clarifying it and giving it expression?

What is there with Dasein, what is found with it as possibilities, comes and starts from a Geschichte des Sein. Continuing his development concerning the es gibt of Sein und Zeit, and in echo to Beiträge,13 Heidegger adds:

Since Being is still unthought of, it is said of Being in Sein und Zeit: “there is” (es gibt). However, man cannot speculate over this il y a without further ado and without a foothold. This “es gibt” prevails (waltet) as the destiny (Geschick) of Being….That is why the thinking which thinks in the truth of Being is, as a thinking, historical (geschichtlich). There is (es gibt), thought more originally (anfänglicher), is the history (Geschichte) of Being.14

It is then that history, Being’s dispensations as historical, which gives the locus, the es gibt for the Da. This had already been made clear in the Beiträge which affirms that “the essence of being as such … contains in itself the call, to man, which attunes man to history.”15 Dasein’s facticity, all Grundstimmungen accompanying and determining it and the possibilities there with it, are handed over, given by Being as part of a history of Being. Dasein is still delivered over but not to itself in its Da in total freedom and facing

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12. See also Heidegger’s Beiträge: “Im Seinsgeschichtlichen Denken kommt erst die Wesensmacht des Nicht-haften und der Umkehrung ins Freie” (1994a, 84).
13. “Here, historicity is grasped as one truth, the clearing sheltering of Being as such”: “Die Geschichtlichkeit hier begriffen als eine Wahrheit, lichtende Verbergung des Seins als solchen” (1994a, 61).
15. “das Wesen des Seins als solchen,… in sich den Zuruf an den Menschen als den zur Geschichte ihn bestimmenden enthält” (Heidegger 1994a, 51).
the abysmal nothingness, but to a certain history: facticity is the facticity of finding oneself in a history. This is precisely where everything changes, and all determinations must shift meaning and purpose.

III. Shifting Notions

*From Burden …*  
First, the notion of burden takes on new, more strictly delineated proportions. The burden in *Sein und Zeit*, as we saw earlier, is my own existence. I must bear the weight of my own facticity, with everything which accompanies it, and be a foundation for myself through a break from all which is hindering my authentic self and its decisions. The burden in the *Kehre* is still that of my existence but there is now added to it the much greater burden of a history which Dasein must take upon itself in every action and decision. This explains the appearance of another term to express this burden, which both reinforces and restricts its scope as a weight. From weight as *die Last* and *die Bürde*, burden, we drift into weight as *schwer*, heavy, coupled with *der Mut*, spirit and courage. Heidegger exposes *die Schwermut*, what is translated as ‘melancholy’ but should be clearly analysed as “heaviness coupled with courage” in, for instance, the *Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*.

Freedom is only where there is the bearing of a burden. In creative work (*Schaffen*), this burden is always, in its own way, an imperative (*Muß*) and a plight (*Not*) which weighs heavily (*schwer*) on man’s mood (*Gemüt*), so that he is in me-lancholy (*ihm schwer zumute ist*). All creative activity is in melancholy (*Schwermut*)—be this clearly known or not.16

This is not an innocent change in terms, but a continued Hermeneutics which effects a turn. Already in 1929–30, the burden required spirit and courage, a *Mut*, which is reaffirmed later in the *Beiträge*’s Being-historical thinking, as the “spirit of courage as the attuned-knowing will of enownment.”17 It is not something which can be shouldered by just anyone. The burden may be there for everyone, and thus the potential for the ensuing freedom, but not everyone will have the right disposition to take it on. The implication is clearly stated here: it is a question of creativity, of a “*schöpfersiche Handeln*” to be precise, a “forming/creating” activity which

16. “Freiheit ist nur, wo das Übernehmen einer Bürde ist. Im Schaffen ist je nach seiner Art diese Bürde ein Muß und eine Not, an der der Mensch schwer trägt im Gemüt, so daß ihm schwer zumute ist. Alles schöpferische Handeln ist in der Schwermut—ob es klar darum weiß oder nicht” (Heidegger 2004b, 270–1).
is the effective operation of the *Schwer-Mut*. Not everyone, from the facticity of Dasein, as factual Dasein, can take on the “Schöpfen.”

A “Narrowing” Mission
There is, secondly, and accompanying the narrowing of the scope of burden, a narrowing as to the taking-on of Dasein’s mission. The courage necessary is clearly declared to be that of the thinker, i.e. the philosopher: “Philosophy stands, as creative (*schöpferische*), essential action of human Dasein, in the ground-attunement of melancholy (*Schwermut*).”\(^{18}\) The philosopher stands in that ground-attunement which is then awakened, and he is from thence the “wakeful” (*Wach-machen*), watchful Dasein (Heidegger 2004b, 91). The theme becomes recurrent, and we find it already implicitly and explicitly in the *Beiträge*, where Being-historical itself depends “totally on thinking.”\(^{19}\); in *Besinnung*, where the philosophers are listed among the rare founders of a new beginning (Heidegger 1997, 60); or in the Hölderlin period’s course on *Germanien* and *der Rhein*, where Being is protected, “sheltered,” by thinking and thus by those who effect it, i.e. the philosophers as thinkers (Heidegger 1999, 180).

The interest in Hölderlin is not incidental of course: it is the expression of a further precision as to who is to express Being-historical’s possibilities, take them on and hand them over. An association and even a fusion is firmly established in the analysis of *der Rhein*, where Heidegger speaks of the distressing plight, *die Not*, for *denkender Dichter* and *dichtender Denker* (226). The thinker, i.e. the philosopher in his/her authentic thinking, and the poet are called upon to effect a foundation, or more accurately to allow for a foundation to come to be. Thus, in the comments on *Germanien*, we read:

> The historical (*geschichtliche*) Dasein of peoples, their ascent, their apex and their fall, spring out of poetry, so does authentic knowledge, in the sense of philosophy; and out of both there springs the actualisation (*Erwirkung*) of the Dasein of a people as people, through the state—the Political.\(^{20}\)

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18. “*Die Philosophie steht als schöpferische, wesentliche Handlung des menschlichen Daseins in der Grundstimmung der Schwermut*” (Heidegger 2004b, 270).
19. “*die völlige Abhängigkeit des Seins vom Denken*” (Heidegger 1994a, 246).
Dasein is thus placed in the possibilities of a historical Dasein, which are made manifest through poetry and philosophy, the latter forming the factual foundation of the “City”—the proper “Political.”

**A “Narrowing” Truth**
Thirdly, such possibilities, if we refer to the *Beiträge* for example, are viewed through a narrowing of the coming about of “truth”: in Being-historical thinking “the truth [of enowning], i.e. The Truth itself, essentialises (west) only in the sheltering as art, thinking, poetry and deed.”21 This is so much the case that Heidegger can say that be-ing (*Seyn*) depends entirely upon thinking (Heidegger 1994a, 265, 456), i.e. upon *denkender Dichten und dichtender Denken*, as we now know.

... to Burden
Fourthly, the double narrowing allows us to return again, this time negatively, to burden. The shift has to do with ‘unburdening’. Whereas Dasein in *Sein und Zeit* unburdens itself on *das Man*, goes with the flow, so to say, and surrenders itself unto inauthenticity; in what becomes the Kehre, it unburdens itself on precisely the philosophers and poets. Such unburdening is authentic in that it is done as a giving over of oneself to the paragons and founders of history, those answering the call authentically. The non-poet, non-philosophising Dasein becomes authentic by proxy and shoulders the weight of existence but does so metaphorically or at best partially.

In fact, if we examine the matter closely, things become more subtle, as we find ourselves in a sort of contradiction: Dasein is in fact not told to simply unburden itself so explicitly. What occurs after *Sein und Zeit* is in continuation of the thinking therein. Dasein must always bear a burden. However, when Dasein becomes “Us” as Dasein, its bearing the burden is its letting the philosophers and poets bear the burden. Thus bearing the burden is a form of unburdening, $p \land \neg p$. What lies at the heart of this, if we are to make sense of the contradiction and reduce it to a semantic nascent polysemic split, is the weight of the burden for individual Dasein becoming the bearing of the burden of the We-Dasein, which burden is placed upon it through an injunction pronounced by the poet and philosopher from their taking on of the burden apportioned to the “rare ones” they are by the history of Being through a call to them expressed in a new language. Viewed in this way, the burden of individual Dasein—which Dasein may of

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21. "Seine Wahrheit, d. h. die Wahrheit selbst, west nur in der Bergung als Kunst, Denken, Dichten, Tat" (Heidegger 1994a, 256).
course still take on, refuse or ignore—is, if accepted, even heavier in a sense, since Dasein is asked to shoulder with and for the rare ones what they are shouldering—without Dasein’s knowing—as well as bear the weight of Dasein’s awareness of its insuperable ignorance and the burden’s unknown consequences.

**Shifting Thrownness**

Fifthly, and finally, the change in Dasein’s mission from its pure factual thrownness in being given over to itself, to its thrownness in being given over to possibilities brought about through the history of Being, means a focus out of Dasein but within new limits imposed upon it. The outward focus means a widened scope in considering facticity; and the new limits mean a primordial delimitation of that facticity. Both are expressed through the concurrent move from a focus on anxiety in *Sein und Zeit* to an implosion which finds those foundational Stimmungen multiply to spell out the various pre-foundational possibilities for facticity.

**IV. A Multiplicity of Attunements: The Way toward Reservedness**

In the *Kehre*, we first find anxiety taken afresh to associate it, beyond Dasein, with being as a whole: “the nothing is encountered in anxiety at one with being (Seienden) as a whole.”²² Nothing, the very heart of “Was Ist Metaphysik,” is made into a theme which is revelatory of Seiende, and it is taken on anew by the ground-attunement of boredom, in its authenticity as profound boredom, where time lasts a long while, *Lange-Weile* (Heidegger 2004a, 110). The latter becomes a central issue in the 1929–1930 winter course, *Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*, and it signals the new return to and broadening of attunements. However, before dealing with the “long-whirling,” Heidegger develops the *Grundstimmungen* as something we need to awaken, i.e. to let “become wakeful” (Heidegger 2004b, sec. 16). The need for this wakefulness in Dasein’s facticity is best understood by going to the *Beiträge*, where the plurality of the Stimmungen is meant to fill a double role: continuing to anchor Dasein in its facticity and bringing Dasein into thinking, both encapsulated in the attuning they effect as “thinking as projecting open the truth of beyng.”²³ The two go together, and the *Grundstimmungen* bring about reservedness (*Verhaltenheit*), the call for thinking

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²². “das Nichts begenet in der Angst in eins mit dem Seienden im Ganzen” (Heidegger 2004a, 113).

²³. “Allein, die Grundstimmung stimmt das Da-sein und damit das Denken als Entwurf der Wahrheit des Seyns” (Heidegger 1994a, 21).
the abandonment of Being (Seinsverlassenheit), and the waiting for what is to come and for those to come (Zukünftigen) (Heidegger 1994a, 33–6, 110–2, 395–9).

Reservedness is itself a ground-attunement—the ground-attunement of the Beiträge—which prepares Dasein for “being thrown into the effective standing in the truth of the turning in enowning.” Through die Verhaltenheit, Dasein is thus ready for its facticity in das Ereignis, which is being-historical. Reservedness’ importance is first in its gathering, a gathering-back unto oneself and “into the destination of its assignment,” its mission; and it is secondly, and conjointly, in its keeping of a history, “the sheltered history of the great stillness.” Briefly stated, reservedness ensures Dasein is thrown in its facticity as authentically historical, i.e. directed to the past and what is to come, and hence to a decision, and thus to being or not-being (Heidegger 1994a, sec. 47).

The abandonment of Being is meant as an objective but especially also, and historically, as a subjective genitive: “That Being (Sein) abandons being (Seiende) means (besagt): Beyng (Seyn) shelters/hides (verbirgt) itself in the manifestation of being.” This concealment in both operations is accentuated by machination: Do we grasp now, asks Heidegger, what the first beginning and its Geschichte teach us: “the essence of beyng as the refusal (Verweigerung) and highest refusal in the great openness of machinations and ‘live-experience (Erlebens).’” To this abandonment in both of its aspects “belongs The forgottenness of Being and at the same time the disintegration of truth.” The two, being an integral part of the history of metaphysics, may only be overcome through a being-historical thinking, which is, as we have just exposed, that determined by the ground-attunement of reservedness.

The waiting for what is to come is a waiting assumed and given over by those thinkers who are “mace bearers of the truth of Beyng.” They have made the decision for Beyng and are the founders of what is to come.

25. “in die Bestimmung seines Auftrags” (34).
26. “die verborgene Geschichte der großen Stille” (35).
29. “Zu ihr gehört die Seinsvergessenheit und ingleichen der Zerfall der Wahrheit” (113).
(Heidegger 1994a, 395). They are appropriated through echo, playing-forth/off (das Zuspiel), leap and grounding, each with its guiding-attunement (die Leitstimmung), which “originarily attune together from within the grounding-attunement.”

Once again, and this time explicitly, while the latter as the factual bringing over of inceptual (anfänglichen) thinking “is hardly to be named with one word,” such polysemy can, however, fall under reservedness, which has then, by the end of the Beiträge, become the highest factual determination for the We-Dasein from within the being-historical “enthinking (Erdenken) of enowning.”

Reservedness, the abandonment of Being and the waiting are all reduced or brought back to reservedness as the highest enthinking factual determination for Dasein. This is the one new and definite determination of Dasein.

V. The Problem of Responsibility
The new determinations I have exposed can only modify Dasein’s relation to die Schuld, essential as it is to thrown Dasein’s facticity (Heidegger 1977, §58). What Sartre says about this Schuld can be of help to us here in realising some of the new facticity’s important effects, which will in turn open a horizon for further studies on further effects.

Sartre translates die Faktizität and our being geworfen as délaissement (Sartre 1943, 530), i.e. as “being abandoned.” Such délaissement becomes for him, in L’Être et le néant, first the starting point for an affirmation of the absence of any pre-definition and thus of God—and any god for that matter—and “human reality” is thus thrown with no origin and no pre-determined project toward the future; and second the intrinsic property of the being handed over to itself, “remis à soi,” who must then become itself—in other words it is a project to and for itself. Both determinations are the starting point for the absolute self-constitution distinctive of atheistic existentialism. But such absolutism is not purely ontological. Sartre draws from it a praxis and an absolute responsibility. It is possible to assert that such responsibility may be also drawn out of Sein und Zeit. The Schuld of section 58 may signify “being responsible for,” schuld sein an, and thus answerable to all acts factual Dasein effects. This is of course part and parcel of determining Dasein ontologically and not an account of a moral


32. “Diese Grundstimmung ... Mit einem Wort aber ist sie kaum zu nennen, es sei denn durch den Namen Verhaltenheit. Aber dann muß dieses Wort in der ganzen Ursprungsfülle genommen werden, die seinem Bedeuten aus dem Erdenken des Ereignisses geschichtlich zuwächst” (395–6).
code nor of an ethics in its usual sense; but it may constitute a first foundation for being-with, das Mitsein and a later ethics, which aims at transforming Dasein into a moral being who is the “condition of access to the truth,” as Foucault (1994) rightly detected it.33

We may then ask what happens to such possibilities in the later version of facticity: whom and what indeed would Dasein be responsible for? The answer requires some fine analysis, but in the end, I will argue, the new thrownness loses its original possibilities.

First, we cannot simply assert that Dasein loses all responsibility. There is in fact, as may be surmised from the second and third parts of this article, an apparent double-bind—hence the ambiguity in later facticity’s responsibility. Dasein is not made non-responsible, and what is more, it is not made merely responsible toward someone else; it remains, despite all shifts, responsible toward itself. What changes is how this responsibility is directed. It is no longer the pure assumption of being thrown into a specific heritage to be assumed and gone beyond into a project carried out by a constantly future-directed Dasein; but rather the responsibility toward oneself as taking on the responsibility of another. That other is not just any alterius but the one or ones who have taken on, in turn, and always before the specific factual Dasein, the responsibility of the truth coming from being as being-historical determining a ground-attunement. Those taking on this second and more foundational responsibility are the ones which ground, the rare ones: the thinkers/philosophers and the poets. Those are, as we saw, the ones to determine the mission by answering the call of being as being-historical, to prepare the coming of the gods and to awaken the ground-attunement of mourning which will welcome the gods’ enowment to/with mortals and start a new historical apportionment of being. To be responsible toward the rare ones means that I am with them in the Grundstimmung of mourning and must be accountable thereto. However, that accountability is no longer to myself but to another, thus divesting me of what in Sartre for example is the taking on of the weight of all humanity in my decisions. I am in other words, in that ground-attunement thus occasioned, no longer accountable toward myself, and Dasein loses the Kantian equivalent of autonomy in Heidegger, i.e. the freedom which is the foundation of accountability, the Schuld as “guilt” toward oneself, in favour of what we may call the “shame” toward others in my not letting myself be enowned through the few and rare ones into mourning. The new facticity with the dispositions which mark it loses what was the possibility

33. See also the 1981–2 course (Foucault 2001).
of a disenfranchised responsibility. It deprives Dasein of its personal responsibility and, precisely in the way it so does, it limits its freedom and thus its freely assumed possibilities.

The conclusion is now clear: the new thrownness by being, which is the very title of this new facticity, does not so much exploit the openings of the first as it makes the passage into the truth of being a locus for a questioning. Such questioning is at best a call for new determinations of the factual, through reservedness and other ground-attunements, and at the worst a recoil before the abyss of the originally evinced anxiety of Dasein, which had marked its original thrownness. This is of course an assertion claiming the limiting effect of the second facticity, but is in no way a limiting of that facticity’s examination in the ambiguities it occasions and which may be the opportunity for a more accurate understanding of what is often termed the second Heidegger.

Bibliography

Heidegger and the Thorny Issue of (Re)configuring Facticity
