
The contributions dedicated to Darowski are written mainly in Polish, sometimes with summaries in other languages. Some contributions are written in foreign languages.

Let us mention them:
Sven K. KNEBEL, *Juan de Alvarado SJ (1578-1648): A Treatise on Beings of Reason (1610).*
Zdzisława KOBYLINSKA, *Reflections on Democracy in the Writings of Luigi Sturzo.*
Charles LOHR, *Aristotelian „Scientia”, the „Artes”, and the Medieval Metamorphoses of Both.*
Hans-Dieter MUTSCHLER, *Utopie und Technik.*
Stanisław PYSZKA, *L’insegnamento della filosofia morale nelle scuole dei gesuiti polacchi e lituani ed in particolare nell’Accademia di Vilna, 1642-1774.*
Tadeusz ROSTWOROWSKI, *Le nozioni chiave dell’opera di Karol Wojtyła «Persona e atto».*
Dmitri SI JERIEBRIAKOV, *Philosophy in the Polotsk Academy.*

Stan. LEŚNIAK


Today the mind-body problem, especially in Anglo-American philosophy, is quite developed. The development in neurobiology is evident and new scientific techniques are succeeding daily in the medical field. Concomitantly, philosophy attempts to develop the theory of the mind-body question.

Bremer’s book is a critical consideration on different philosophical solutions of this broad problem, with special attention to the question of consciousness. Within this area of investigation one can identify a particularly difficult question: how consciousness is related to subjectivity.
Bremer starts his considerations from Block’s methodological distinction between „phenomenal” and „access” consciousnesses. The first type is based on similitude: „it is like being in the state of”, and the second – refers to intentions. The double views: from (analytical) philosophy and from neural science are presented in the book.

The important thesis of Bremer’s book claims that the subjectiveness of consciousness has not been explained by any contemporary philosophical reductive explanation, where the absence of subjectivity is similar to the „zombie” problem. For, the terms of functional or intentional theories apply to computers and robots which have behavior but no „experience.” On the other hand the causal terms do not allow analysis of subjectivity.

There are seven chapters in the book. The first introduces the main concepts of Block’s and Sellar’s distinctions of consciousness within an holistic approach to its ontology and methodology. On that basis a draft of philosophy of mind is presented, as well as phenomenal consciousness from a philosophical and metaphysical viewpoint. The externalism and internalism arguments of Putnam, Burge, Tye, Searle are described on „the inverted spectrum argument”, „zombie argument”, „Chinese room argument.” Bremer’s book continues on the internalist point of view, where mental states depend on brain states.

Chapter two presents the „hard” problem of subjectivity and unity of consciousness within the philosophical and psychological point of view, focused on the REM dream phase. Having constructed this model allows searching for a „neural correlate of consciousness.” Bremer claims that any kind of reductionism (such as reduction of mental states to neurology) is not correct, because something important is lost by such a simplified model. In chapter three he goes on to analyze the materialistic theories of Smart, Place, Armstrong, Churchland, Davidson, Kripke, Block, Shoemaker, Robinson, Lycan, Broad and Stephan.

Chapters four and five describe Dennett’s and Nagel’s approaches to consciousness. The „functional” theory and „Multiple Drafts Model” of Dennett is focused on the first person’s point of view and place. In opposition to that stands Nagel’s panpsychical approach – he searches for an empirical connection between the physical and the mental.

The last two chapters, six and seven, describe a methodology to search for „neural correlates of consciousness.” The neurological point of view is sketched (neuropsychology, neurophenomenology, neurophilosophy), and a prototheory of consciousness is proposed. He defines neural correlates of holistic consciousness and of its special states. On that basis Bremer tries to link folk psychology and neural theory and mental and physical states within the emergent dynamism. Thus constructed „reduction without identification” can be a stage to the developing scientific theory of consciousness.

Besides this goal Bremer’s book shows that materialistic theories of mind fail on subjectivity. The reduction or identification of mental states excludes phenomenal characteristics of consciousness. Any future neural mind theory must consider subjective experience.

Robert JANUSZ
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