Bien que la philosophie de l'homme contenue dans ce livre soit d'inspiration thomiste, elle est ouverte aux acquisitions des courants philosophiques postérieurs, y compris contemporains, notamment de la phénoménologie et du personalisme.


Stanisław LEŚNIAK


This is a new edition of the manual published in 1974 and 1984. Compared with those earlier editions it is revised, enlarged and more precise in its argumentation.

In its beginnings the manual aimed at meeting the didactic needs to present students of the Faculty of Christian Philosophy at the ATK (Academy of Catholic Theology in Warsaw) a complete handling of Christian ethics. The author, who wrote his manual in difficult times of communist ideology, decided to include in one work, besides a positive exposition of Christian ethics, a critical discussion with other ethical systems as well as his own explicit theory on Augustinian and Thomistic ethics, which he endeavoured to develop. Thus the work interlocked the didactic objectives and the process of growth and justification of the Author's views (R. Darowski SJ, *Filozofia Jezuitów w Polsce w XX wieku* [Jesuits' Philosophy in Poland in the 20th century], Kraków 2001, p. 308).

T. Ślipko – as he himself states – continues „Christian ethics 'as traditional Thomistic ethics', which was a long time ago named as 'neoscholastic ethics', and somewhat later as 'neo-Thomistic ethics'. It constitutes some kind of philosophical-ethical synthesis developed in the 19th and 20th centuries by such authors as L. d'Azeglio Taparelli (he initiated this direction of Thomistic thought) and after him a whole line of authors of standard manuals on Thomistic ethics, written in Latin, e.g. Th. Meyer, V. Catherin, E. Elter, L. Lehu, E. Th. Toccafondi, I. Moral Gonzales". (T. Ślipko, *Wprowadzenie do etyki chrześcijańskiej* (An Introduction to Christian Ethics), „Życie Katolickie", 3 (1984) p. 41.)

Basically, it is a Thomistic ethics. However, it includes some views borrowed from St. Augustine by Christian ethics. Therefore, in a broader perspective it can be defined as Augustinian-Thomistic ethics.

It is in the first part that the Author defines the method of this ethics. It is a continuation of the method proposed by Taparelli in his critique of idealistic
rationalism and relativistic empiricism. He aimed at renewing the ethics of natural law on the basis of the experience of ethical facts. T. Ślipko elaborates on this experience not only in his further discussion with rationalistic, intuitionistic and empirical trends but also in his discussion with the proposals of contemporary Thomists. He proclaims himself in favour of the empirical orientation in the beginning of ethics but he also works out his own concept of ethical experience. It embraces inner experience, i.e. realizing your own moral intuitions, and outer experience including objectified in transmitted customs states of social moral awareness. The interpretation and justification of what is given in such an understood experience are made taking into consideration metaphysical and anthropological assumptions suitable to Thomistic ethics. At this stage ethics cannot be an ethics independent of philosophy but it becomes its integral part.

To clarify this proposal the Author first enumerates the accepted fundamental assumptions from the theory of cognition, from philosophy of man as person and from metaphysics. Many contemporary authors conceal their own philosophical presuppositions pretending to avoid labels that could be stucked on their philosophies. However, the lack of critical information concerning assumptions of your own philosophy causes that it is the reader himself who must, laboriously, discover from which philosophical trends, methods and ideas the author assumed, and what anthropological metaphysical attitudes the presented views implicate.

Beginning with the integrally understood ethical fact, which consists of desiring happiness, experiencing value and experiencing obligation, the manual develops essential fields of ethics: eudaemonology, axiology, deontology. In the presentation of these branches one can see that eudaemonology undergoes special reinterpretation. T. Ślipko opposes both the questioning of eudaemonism as an ethical theory by I. Kant or phenomenologists, and posing it by some Thomists as a fundamental theory, which defines and justifies moral good. (See T. Biesaga, *Wkład Ks. T. Ślipki w rozwój etyki tomistycznej* (Fr. T. Ślipko's Contribution to the Development of Thomistic Ethics), „Studia Philosophiae Christianae” 26 (1990) 2, pp. 101-107). Eudaemonism does not give the possibility to define moral good. It is not that something is good because it gives happiness but the other way round, it gives happiness because it is good.

The specificity of moral good can be defined in the domain of axiology. Here we are to do with constant and unalterable moral values (e.g. justice, truthfulness, love), which are models, ideals of conduct. Their specificity is revealed not only by appealing to purposeful structure of particular categories of human acts but also by attributing these acts to dignity and exemplary perfection of person. This conformity to the ideal of perfection of person outlines a world of values, which is specific for man and which classical philosophy calls honest good (*bonum honestum*). Such an explanation gives this axiology and ethics personalistic and perfectionistic character.

The concept of 'co-ordination of axiological scope of moral values', introduced by T. Ślipko, is an interesting reinterpretation of the Thomistic theory of values. This proposal presents how to solve the problem of universality of moral norms, shaken by a real conflict of values. An example can be the
conflict between truthfulness and the right to discretion, i.e. keeping secret, or the conflict between the right to exist and the right to necessary defence against direct aggression. The Thomists' reference to the principle of double effect is in this case not convincing. Thus the introduction of the co-ordination of values leads to the fact that the victim's life is defended by the principle: Do not kill, and the aggressor's life is by himself placed beyond this principle. The norm 'do not kill' is generally important, but with the restriction: the exception of direct aggression.

In the perspective of the presented axiology T. Ślipko reinterprets the existing Thomistic deontology. In this approach natural law, moral imperative, is rooted in moral values. Values penetrate natural law with their axiological contents, their reference to person's dignity, to an ideal model of person's improvement. In relation to values moral imperative reveals its normative dissimilarity thanks to the relation of necessity to realise that superior model of personal perfection of man. Imperativeness, normativeness of natural law is not, therefore, a necessity to realise natural inclinations nor a necessity to realise the ultimate goal, but a necessity to improve oneself as person.

The ethics, presented and developed by T. Ślipko, avoids naturalistic and eudaemonistic interpretation of moral good as well as its subjectivism or relativism. It is a personalistic and perfectionist ethics, which at the same time gives an ultimate explanation of moral being.

Tadeusz BIESAGA


Józef Bremer's book, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Religion, is the first extensive Polish commentary on Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion and is worth reading even if for no other reason. As author suggests in the subtitle, the book is not intended for specialists. However, it is difficult to understand the arguments without a general knowledge of Wittgenstein's philosophy. It has a loose structure and can be regarded as a collection of essays preceded by a chapter introducing the problems of Wittgenstein's philosophy. The task which the author has undertaken is very ambitious, because even a sketchy presentation and interpretation of Wittgenstein's remarks on religion is difficult – precisely because it is sketchy. There are several reasons for this. First, understanding Wittgenstein's views concerning religion requires a perfect understanding of all aspects of his philosophy, since it is impossible to separate his considerations on religion from the rest of his investigations. Secondly, Wittgenstein's writings are full of ambiguous aphorisms and not always conclusive mini-dialogues, which is why there exist many alternative interpretations of his texts. Thirdly, only a few of his notes about religion have been published.

In his book Bremer takes into account all of Wittgenstein's crucial remarks referring to religion. He also shows the connections between Wittgenstein's