
Assuming, according to Jaspers, that the measure of truth of a philosophical system is the lifestyle of its creator as well as his ability at drawing conclusions resulting from philosophical speculation to the requirements of practical action, the question must be asked, to what extent, if at all Wojciech Słomski’s book tries to recognise and name the philosophically characteristic merging of theory and practise.

Despite this, it shouldn’t be the superior aim of any biography, let alone the biography of a philosopher (where this kind of behaviour would force the author to take up the position of a judge for whom the reproducing of a true biography is a process coming close to producing a final verdict). However in the case of Professor Antoni Kępiński, the connection between theoretical views and real life holds meaning not only for judging the truth of these views but most of all for a correct understanding of them. The above theory seems intuitively obvious, however its justification and especially an examination of the conclusions resulting from it, would be a great deal more complicated and difficult than it seems, for a popular understanding of philosophy. From this point of view, every biography of A. Kępiński is an addition to his theoretical considerations. His biographies become his interpreters to a much greater extent and in a different sense to that in which this occurs in the biographies of philosophers whose life stories do not arouse so much controversy.

W. Słomski is of course aware of this fact and of the responsibility connected with it and expresses his consciousness of this many times. One could get the impression that for the author the importance of the merging of theory and practise is so obvious that he resigns from an exact, notional distinguishing between the reconstruction of A. Kępiński’s theoretical opinions and the reconstruction of his life choices and decisions. He treats both these areas as symptoms of a wider and more thorough stance on life. In other words W. Słomski seems to assume the existence of certain specific and hidden truths (less about whether we consider this true only for philosophy, treated as a continuous effort at searching for the truth about the world, or for every form of creativity) assuming at the same time that the best way to get to this truth is through a simultaneous analysis of philosophical works as well as their functions, while not for example through a deep look at the psychological complexities of his personality.

Due to this, it is also necessary to ask the question: Is W. Słomski’s book a biography of A. Kępiński filled with reconstructions of his philosophical views or rather a historical work in its own right whose meaning reaches beyond the problem of A. Kępiński’s philosophy? The ideal biography should take into account the whole of the individual’s life, contain a complete description of his works and also teach the ideas and motivations from every part of the individual’s life. It should however refrain from making subjective judgements and hypotheses which prove difficult to check or completely impossible to verify. This type of theoretical model of an ideal biography can also serve to describe a type of concrete biography, and also an assessment of the degree of objectivism
(without deciding if this objectivism is intentional or not). It is easy to see that W. Słomski's text is not a real biography in the strict sense of the word, but rather includes one and makes use of one in its aim, which extends beyond a pure biographical construction. This statement shouldn't surprise us considering the fact that the basic aim of the author remains an explanation of Kępiński's progression towards his philosophy of man. We must take it into account, however because the text itself contains every external indication of a biography and can give the impression that we are just dealing with another biographical work and nothing more.

Meanwhile, we would have to deal with a biography, in the strict sense of the word, if at the basis of the biographical reconstruction was a desire to understand A. Kępiński's attitude and to explain it in a way which was not already established at the starting point of any evaluating perspective. While reading, it is worth thus remembering that in fact the author brings up problems markedly more fundamental and monumental than the whole lifespan of one of our twentieth century philosophers. His work will become a study of a concrete case, however this case will be treated as a certain symptom, a certain sign, of that about which philosophers unwillingly speak and equally unwillingly admit to: the book does not only concern itself with the issue of the influence of philosophical ideas on the real world as this influence is an obvious matter not necessary of discussion but above all the responsibility which philosophers ought to bear for their own propagated ideas.

It is worth finally turning our attention to one thing, in principle obvious but often underestimated in discussion. A. Kępiński was not only a psychiatrist but also a philosopher and without his philosophical achievements, the so-called casus, would not have existed at all. Therefore, when speaking of A. Kępiński and his convictions, it is necessary to make use equally of extensive, detailed knowledge of realities and a deep acquaintance of the state of philosophical discussion. One must admit that W. Słomski moves in both fields with an equal freedom without exposing the reader to an unpleasant discord between his own knowledge and the knowledge passed on by the author.

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Książka wybitnego znawcy problematyki filozofii, socjologii i politologii profesora i akademika Włodzimierza Kokluchina zwraca uwagę przede wszystkim czymś, co określić można mianem „pozaczasowości”, a co polega na tym, że mimo swego uwikłania w konkretną rzeczywistość początku XXI wieku ogarnia ona prawidłowości rządzące polityką w procesie jej przemian w czasie. Odniesienia do konkretnych sytuacji tu na ogół charakter egzemplifikacji i służą głównie ukonkretnieniu rozważań dotyczących problemów poza tę konkretność wykraczających. Owa „pozaczasowość” odnosi się zresztą w równym stopniu do przeszłości, jak i do przyszłości, w równym bowiem stopniu Autorowi udaje się