We must be grateful for this well researched review which offers an unusual fraternity of philosophers each of whom is revealed in scholarly detail and with sympathy. We are benefiting from years of study, discussion, and contemplation, by one whose spiritual leader was Gandhi and whose husband was famous as a parliamentary leader of Hindu nationalism.

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So-called analytic philosophy is undoubtedly one of the most popular styles of contemporary philosophy. It was developed in the USA and Great Britain at the beginning of the 20th century. At present, the proponents of this approach to philosophy can be found on all the continents where philosophy is practised. Analytic philosophers have drawn attention to language and the argumentation of philosophical theses. And although both language and philosophical argumentation had been the focus of attention of philosophers for a long time, it was the analytic philosophers who truly revolutionised this field, by means of the application to these issues of the formal tools of dynamically developing contemporary logics. Analytic philosophy has recently been enjoying enormous popularity. This is indicated by the growing number of conferences, both national and international, monographs, and an impressive number of articles published in different scientific periodicals. The situation in Poland is similar. Here also, from year to year, the interest in analytic philosophy grows, as does the number of publications and specialists, who devote all their intellectual efforts to exploring this complex and interesting trend in contemporary philosophy. Professor Tadeusz Szubka, in his recently published metaphilosophical study entitled *Analytic Philosophy. Concepts, Methods, Limitations*, has undertaken to describe the trends and methods of contemporary analytic philosophy. In the introduction, the author says: “(…) the idea of writing this monograph first appeared when I was preparing my postdoctoral degree at the beginning of 2002. It is intended partly as a summary of many years of research into analytic philosophy, which I started in the early 1980s while preparing my Master’s and then PhD thesis under the supervision of rev. Professor Stanisław Kamiński at the Catholic University of Lublin. It is also supposed to be a modest contribution to Polish research in the field of analytic philosophy, which has resulted, among others, in the publications by Michał Hempoliński, Jacek Juliusz Jadacki, Stanisław Kamiński and Jan Woleński” (p. 8) Describing the objective of his study, the author says: “This monograph is by no means a complete review of analytic philosophy. Nevertheless, it is a certain attempt at its methodological organization and evaluation, containing not only the well-known trends and schools,
which are often presented in textbooks or contemporary philosophical reviews, but also the most recent tendencies. I must admit that it is written from the perspective of a moderate proponent of analytic philosophy, but a proponent who does not tend to glorify it or deprecate all other trends in contemporary philosophy. I believe that it should be respected and recognized mostly because its representatives are less inclined to resort to a pompous and pretentious philosophical discourse than the adherents of other philosophical trends or styles” (p. 7). The author, following the example of S. Kamiński, adopts the metaphilosophical perspective of studying the trends, methods and limitations of analytic philosophy. The monograph by Professor T. Szubka consists of three chapters and 252 pages. In the first chapter, the author discusses several issues. Firstly, he analyses the meaning of the very term ‘analytic philosophy’. He studies its origins and the circumstances in which it was introduced into philosophical discourse. Having established the connotations of the term “analytic philosophy” and by which philosophers and schools it is thus designated, Szubka goes on to characterize analytic philosophy by means of describing its basic trends and tendencies. In order to present analytic philosophy more thoroughly, the author contrasts analytic philosophy with speculative philosophy, understood as Neo-Hegelianism, and continental philosophy, which includes existentialism, phenomenology and hermeneutics. On the basis of this confrontation, he presents the individual style, nature and research methods of analytic philosophy. Thanks to this confrontation we can comprehend the fundamental differences between these philosophical trends. The chapter finishes with a presentation of basic trends, schools and tendencies which have arisen in analytic philosophy. In the second chapter, Professor Szubka discusses the methods which have been used by prominent representatives of analytic philosophy. He discusses these methods in relation to the examples presented by analytic philosophers of different trends and periods. The characteristics presented include semiotic, epistemological and methodological aspects. Having discussed the methods applied, in chapter three, Professor Szubka explores the question of the cognitive limitations of contemporary analytic philosophy. To this end, he quotes three criticisms of analytic philosophy. The first criticism was made by an American analytic philosopher – B. Blanchard – a proponent of Neo-Hegelian idealism practised in a manner typical of Bradley, Bosanquet and Royce. The author of the second criticism is E. Gellner. His criticism referred to the linguistic period of analytic philosophy. The criticism made by R. Rorty had a significant influence on the development of analytic philosophy. Szubka agrees with many of Rorty’s reservations regarding the style in which analytic philosophers practice philosophy. According to Professor Szubka, the limitations of analytic philosophy derive from scientism, a-historicism and naturalism. Scientism is connected with the tendency of analytic philosophers to make philosophy similar to the pure and natural sciences. Another limitation of analytic philosophy comes from the fact that it does not take into account the history of the development of particular philosophical ideas and trends. Szubka is right to separate the philosophical practice from its history. While a biologist or chemist does not need to know well the history of his/her discipline, such a situ-
ation is unacceptable in the case of a philosopher. Another limitation of analytic philosophy is naturalism. Methodological and ontological naturalism have become a kind of ideology among analytic philosophers. It is a certain *credo* of practicing philosophy. While discussing naturalism, the author shows its internal difficulties and points to the problems related to a philosophy which adopts dogmatically, as a starting point, the assumptions of naturalism. He emphasizes, after B. Williams, that analytic philosophy should get rid of scientistic illusions and stop imitating the natural or formal sciences in order to make philosophy come across as scientifically accurate. It should also abandon the condescending attitude to the history of philosophy. Getting rid of the scientistic desire to turn philosophy into a formal science, rejecting the anti-historic attitude, and giving up naturalism, could be a starting point for overcoming the limitations hampering analytic philosophy.

In the third paragraph of the third chapter we can find the metaphilosophical views of Professor Szubka concerning the nature of philosophy. The issues presented are treated in a very general way and constitute a sort of introduction to a more thorough metaphilosophical study related to the peculiarities of philosophy. On the basis of what is said there we can assume that the author understands philosophy as an antidogmatic discipline, which becomes independent from the adopting of views on religion. Hence, it is devoid of the proper epistemic justification. He understands philosophy in an antifundamentalist and minimalist way. Practicing philosophy begins from a certain starting point, but it is not a neutral starting point, as a philosopher never starts from nothing. Professor Szubka assumes, that what constitutes this starting point in philosophy, are certain existing intuitions. The task of the philosopher is to analyse those intuitions and join them together into a coherent whole. Philosophy aims at achieving a theoretical balance. To obtain this balance, we often have to modify a certain opinion or even reject it. The balance that philosophy should be aiming at must not be limited to a given area of our beliefs, but is should cover all the philosophical and extra-philosophical beliefs. The objective of philosophy is to obtain a certain kind of reflective equilibrium. However, Szubka does not show how to do that but leaves this question open.

At the end of his discourse, quoting the opinion of Priest, Professor Szubka states that contemporary analytic philosophy is subject to a certain disintegration and division. It is not the same philosophy we dealt with at the beginning, when its foundations were being developed by Moore and Russell. What will be the future of analytic philosophy? The author does not give a clear answer to this question, as it is impossible to predict it now. In this respect we can only speculate, but being an analytic philosopher, Szubka is not inclined to speculate. Quite simply, “time will show” what happens with analytic philosophy, whether, influenced by the processes of globalization, it will undergo such a radical transformation that even the very term “analytic philosophy” will be replaced with another category, which will more accurately describe the future state of affairs. Tadeusz Szubka’s dissertation is written in the spirit of a moderate approach to analytic philosophy. The author avoids extreme views. He does not glorify analytic philosophy. He
does not believe that everything that can be said in and about philosophy may only be said from the perspective of analytic philosophy. He appreciates analytic philosophy for the fact that it puts great emphasis on the precision of statements and on the justification of philosophical theses. He appreciates analytic philosophers for not trying to build maximalist philosophical systems. The minimalist approach presented by analytic philosophers is not less valuable than the approach of maximalists who develop lofty theories, but who do not bother to make their statements precise or to adequately justify their opinions. He also avoids the other extreme approach, which completely rejects the analytic style of doing philosophy. Thanks to his adoption of a golden mean, the author presents a balanced evaluation of analytic philosophy. Such a study was needed, since in the Polish literature of the subject there are still very few such balanced and moderate “golden mean” approaches. The monograph by T. Szubka is written in a clear and precise language. The author was trying to make his thoughts as precise as possible. He avoids repetitions, which is a true art and a common problem of many writers. Reading the work of Professor Szubka is a real schooling in clear expression and communication of thoughts on difficult subjects. The way the author presents analytic philosophy encourages the reader to study it and to think creatively. The book is an exciting intellectual venture into the complicated world of analytic philosophy.

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Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik, Odkrywanie aksjologicznego wymiaru nauki [Discovering the Axiological Dimension of Science], John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin Press, Lublin, 2008.

The issue of the axiology of science has received much attention in recent decades. Indeed, the recognition of the value-ladenness of science is one of the most important changes in the meta-scientific reflection on science in the 20th century. In Poland this specific problem is studied particularly by the philosophers in the Department of Philosophy at the Catholic University of Lublin. The scholars from this centre have published a number of articles in this area, and in 2008 published two extensive monographs on the subject: the first one (intended for 2007) was written by a retired professor of philosophy of science and philosophy of nature, Zygmunt Hajduk, under the title: Science and Values: Axiology of Science – Epistemic Axiology. It was an attempt to summarize and develop the decades of research in this field; the second one is the monograph reviewed here, written by Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik, an adjunct scholar in the chair of methodology of science at the same university.

In her book, she aims not so much to describe real science at to develop an ideal of science by answering questions such as: “what types of values should be